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Abstract 
When one thinks about powerful and influential traditional actors of the International system, 
Russia cannot be ruled out of this select group. Despite the oscillations by which the State had 
been through in the post-Cold War period, the international community witnessed, since the 
beginning of the 21st century, the recovery of its status quo as an influential power among both 
the developed countries and, mainly, the developing countries, and the BRICS is perhaps the 
greatest expression of this rise. As the dynamics of power within the system become more 
flexible on the threshold of the 21st century, moving from a traditional range of military 
resources to covering new demands linked to new technologies, especially the internet, Russia 
seeks to use them as a resource of power. Thus, this paper aims to understand how cyber 
resources takes part of the Russian strategy to rebuild its power in the International System and 
how significant these resources are to the new understanding of the State capacity of the Russian 
Federation. It's then believed that cyber resources act as a profitable power tool for Russia’s 
reentering the international arena. It is supported by the concept of “strategic deterrence” 
assumed in the country’s Military Doctrine (2014), which sustains military (conventional and 
nuclear) and non-military tools (political, economic, scientific measures). 
Keywords: Russia. Power. Cyber Resources.  
Introduction 
The end of the Cold War seems to be a much more significant timeframe for international 
politics than just the ending of the bipolarity between the United States of America (US) and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). This historic moment marked the 
construction of a new way of understanding the world reality from the social, political, 
economic and security points of view. 
Throughout the 1990s, the world experienced an exponential improvement in its 
interactivity, but at the same time it moved towards a homogenization process that promised to 
be the solution to the inequalities so far faced worldwide. Thanks to globalization, every person 
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would be equal, with the same possibilities and challenges. As warned by Manuel Castell 
(2011), Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2010), Joseph Stiglitz (2003) and many others, this 
scenario did not happen. What in fact occurred was an increase in violence, inequality and the 
continuity of the political processes that preserved the promotion of benefits to the most 
powerful countries of the International System. 
However, despite the fact that the globalization did not fulfill its promise, it would still 
bring to the system the rise of new actors who no longer needed to hide under the umbrella of 
the system's traditional powers. These actors emerged, prioritizing a new rhetoric of power and 
using new power resources to sustain it. Thus, in 1997, we witnessed the BRICS4 (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa) appear as the promise of a new power pole coming from 
the peripheral countries and bringing to the system a new way of interaction. Alongside the 
BRICS, society will see the growing influence and dependence that the advancement of digital 
technologies is bringing on people's daily lives. And, naturally, such resources will become a 
new important aspect to building the State’s power in the international sphere. 
However, it is a fact that Russia, the central theme of this article, cannot effectively be 
considered as a new power pole. Its history and influence on the system are noticeable, yet the 
collapse of the USSR and its reorganization as the Russian Federation imposed a new way of 
interacting with the system, as well as a new perception of what space it intended to occupy in 
international politics. This new state perspective, as a Russian Federation, put that country as a 
kind of new power pole, being part of the select group of those States who have decision-
making capacity in the International system. Russia also acts as a potential State, which 
reappears and regains its importance in the international arena by envisioning new strategic 
dimensions as the foundation of its external actions. 
Before this scenario, the article proposes that we should think about how Russia, a 
central power in the bipolarity of the Cold War, rose in the 21st century to become an exponent 
of power. It should also be considered as to how cyber resources became a part of the new 
strategy of international insertion of that State. Our proposal is to analyze the recovery of 
Russia's status quo in the 21st century and how it is directly related to the BRICS and to new 
technologies as power resources. Based on the concept of “Strategic Deterrence”, adopted by 
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the 2014 Russian Military Doctrine, a preliminary guiding hypothesis can be assumed: by 
prioritizing conventional and unconventional military means to build its reinsertion into the 
system, Russia deems cyber technology as an important power resource, making use of it in the 
international power struggle throughout the 21st century.  
Power: from the Cold War end to the 21st century  
To think of power in international politics is usually to associate coercive actions and resources 
with a strategy that increasingly seeks to satisfy State demands within the international sphere. 
This rhetoric seemed to prevail in the international system throughout the 20th century, 
especially during the Cold War and its arms race context. 
However, as argued by Byung Chul-Han (2019, p. 12) “the coercive model does not live 
up to the complexity of power. Power as coercion consists in imposing one's own decisions 
against the will of the other”. With the end of bipolar cleavage, the coercive rhetoric is losing 
ground, mainly because there is no longer the other, the enemy, once the world is now 
intertwined in a single globalized society. 
This is the context that led Joseph Nye to introduce his perception of soft power in the 
1990s debate on international politics and power. This concept does not imply to coerce the 
counterpart but to convince it, through cultural resources, political values, and foreign policy 
actions, (Nye, 2004) that it benefits from following the preference of the State that exerts 
power–and it certainly could be the case, but it is, in fact, not guaranteed.  
Thus, Nye translates soft power as follows: 
A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries-
admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and 
openness-want to follow it. […] This soft power – getting others to want the outcomes 
that you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them. (Nye, 2004: 5). 
In sum, example and identity gain more importance than the effective ability to coerce 
and compel others to do something that a powerful state wants. In a connected and borderless 
world, as proposed by globalization, where there is no other but in fact an integration, the logic 
of power changes. New cyber technologies, especially the internet, emerged in this perspective 
as a means of bringing people and countries closer together. The resource that was born to be 
military spread out to civil society in the post-Cold War period and now determines the way in 
which society develops and communicates, thus becoming an essential resource for human life 
(Ayres Pinto; Pagliari, 2019; Kuehl, 2009; Flournay; Sulmeyer, 2018). 
Danielle Jacon Ayres Pinto  JCIR: BRICS Special Edition (2020) 
Larlecianne Piccolli 
Riva Sobrado de Freitas 
 
86 
 
Nevertheless, another historic event would change this perception of power that arose 
in the 1990s: the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center in New York. This attack 
undermined the perception of the non-existence of the other, showing that instead of Western 
values and culture being praised, they were actually devalued and attacked due to constant 
attempts by the US to control other States and utilise warlike behavior against these 
aforementioned States in the 1990s. 
The American response to the September 11 attack was a return to a coercive, 
threatening, will-imposing, and invading country model of power, using violence as a modus 
operandi. However, the world no longer effectively bears this kind of bellicose interaction 
because of the increasing costs of coercion, both from an economic point of view and, mainly, 
from the relational point of view. The effective interdependence of the system actors made 
coercive actions increasingly objectionable and thus unhelpful in meeting the demands of the 
actors. An example of this is the US military action in Afghanistan and Iraq post 2001 and the 
high political and economic costs imposed to the Americans without the expected earning—the 
elimination of those it considered its enemies. 
Faced with this scenario, a dilemma emerges: the traditional resources of power cannot 
be abandoned, meanwhile, on the basis of coercive logic, as they no longer make the same 
effect as they would have done previously. At this point, Joseph Nye (2011) would sharpen his 
understanding of power in the 21st century by providing his perception on the concept of smart 
power5. The first idea is to dispel the misperception that smart power is an improved soft power. 
According to Nye (2011: XIV) “Smart Power is not simply 'soft power 2.0'”.  
For the author, this new perception involves more than power resources—it concretely 
includes an effective capacity to mold an international insertion strategy that understands the 
dynamics of interdependence in the system. In this sense, the author affirms that: 
A smart power narrative for the twenty-first century is not about maximizing power or 
preserving hegemony. It is about finding ways to combine resources into successful 
strategies in the new context of power diffusion and 'rise of rest' (Nye, 2011: 207-208). 
For Nye (2011) there are two new post-September 11 dynamics in the system: a 
transition of power (new state actors are achieving more influence) and a diffusion of power 
 
5
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(new non-state actors are earning the ability to exercise power). This trend is directly linked to 
new technological resources and their lower costs. 
In this context of transition and diffusion of power, cyber resources become essential, 
as stated by Richard Haass: 
The principal characteristic of twenty-first-century international relations is turning out 
to be nonpolarity: a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather 
by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power. This represents a 
tectonic shift from the past. [...] the proliferation of information is as much a cause of 
nonpolarity as is the proliferation of weaponry (Haass, 2008: N/A). 
Hence, cyber power becomes an effective resource for the new system dynamics, and 
its concept can be defined as the “ability to use cyberspace to create advantages and influence 
events in others operational environments and across the instruments of power” (Nye, 2010: 4). 
The logic of power does not change; what differs is the consideration of technological resources 
as means for the exercise of power, both in the virtual world as well as in the non-virtual world. 
Therefore, the States that possess such resources need to understand how to use them and also 
the role they play in the strategy of insertion into the international system. As was mentioned 
before, considering its official documents, the Russian Federation seems to have understood 
the importance of defining such precepts for its own insertion strategy. 
However, within a more explanatory approach, it is important to observe the table 
established by Joseph Nye to determine cyber power resources: 
Physical and Virtual Dimensions of Cyber Power 
 
Source: Nye, 2010: 5.  
In this sense, it is reasonable to realize that not only the control and dissemination of 
information but also the use of cyber systems to damage critical infrastructures (which are 
extra-cyberspace) are possible actions in this new logic of power in the 21st century. 
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Accordingly, those that are determined by States as cyber resources (or as composing resources 
of this sphere of action) can be used in an insertion strategy not only as coercive means but also 
in a logic of co-optation. What seems to be decisive for the course of action is the actual 
political, economic and security costs involved and how states can afford them.  
Bearing in mind the above theoretical framework, next we will proceed with analyzing 
how Russia, through its strategic documents—especially its 2014 Military Doctrine—defines 
the use of these cyber resources and also what role the BRICS play in this Russian strategy. 
Russia and the new power resource: cyber power enters the country doctrinal conceptions  
Analyzing Russia's strategic positioning in the 21st century international system inevitably 
entails understanding–even briefly–the unfolding systemic chaos that plagued the country in 
the 1990s. As aforementioned, in a context of redefinition and rearrangements of power in the 
international system, the political-economic system and the Russian social fabric deteriorated, 
weakening the country's position in the new established order. The State reorganization 
experienced since the year 2000 indicates a reinsertion in the international system. Such a 
process benefited, on the one hand, from the maintenance of its great power status (based on its 
strategic nuclear military capabilities) and, on the other, by the new power dynamics that 
emerged in the post-Cold War period. 
 The decline and subsequent dissolution of the USSR was caused by a combination of 
political, economic and military factors exacerbated by Gorbachev's reformist policies 
(Perestroika and Glasnost) and nationalist mobilizations in the Soviet republics. The Belavezha 
Accords marked the end of the USSR, the Cold War and the bipolarity of the international 
system. A period of transition began and it was initially characterized by the US hegemony in 
the scenario of a globalized capitalist world where Russian insertion took place in a nefarious 
way. 
The 1990s was a disastrous and traumatic period in Russia. Economic decline plagued 
the country with GDP falling by almost half in the early years. 
On the political sphere, the “democratic” government of President Yeltsin has gradually 
presented itself as a failed and controlling administration, conducting absurd episodes such as 
the bombing of the Duma (Parliament) to dislodge political opponents. The country's erratic 
privatization process has promoted the formation of groups of billionaires who squandered 
national heritage while the population drowned in poverty. The Russian society witnessed a 
major decline in the size of the population, as well as in the life expectancy of the population. 
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Further issues were seen due to high unemployment rates, uncontrolled growth in the number 
of mafias, crime, violence and conflict–the last ones being demonstrated by both Chechen Wars 
in 1994 and 1999 (Visentini, 2017). 
In short, what was seen in the 1990s in Russia was a breakdown of the State and a lack 
of administrative capacity generated an internal systemic chaos that was soon reflected in the 
external position of the country. In this regard, a wholly Western-oriented foreign policy kept 
relations with the United States as a priority in the hope that rapprochement with Western 
institutions would provide the necessary support for the resumption of economic growth and 
political stabilization. It was not long before Moscow showed its discontent with the 
contradictory Western aid unveiled in invasive policies consolidated in the Kosovo military 
onslaught and in the NATO expansion process. 
The new millennium renews the framework of competition through the resurgence of 
centrifugal forces that, on the one hand, remove the predominance of power from the unipolar 
core and, on the other, reshape the conceptual core of power by encompassing new tools for its 
execution in the international arena. Thus, after a period of predominance of unipolar 
configuration of the international order, we are in the process of consolidating a restructured 
international system which is now multipolar. Among the new poles of power, Russia reappears 
in a position of political, military and economic importance, thereby safeguarding its interests 
in this new configuration of the system (Piccolli, 2012; Piccolli, Dall’Agnol, Pereira, 2018). 
Thus, after the turmoil of the 1990s, Moscow began to rebuild its political unity and 
reestablish itself in economic terms which allowed the country to orient a project for its 
reinsertion in the international system. The governments of Vladimir Putin and Dmitri 
Medvedev were able to manage the political stability (achieved through a process of state 
centralization and strengthening of executive power) and economic growth (driven by 
hydrocarbon exports), which were fundamental to achieving their goals in the face of the new 
world order. Likewise, the governments were mindful of the changes in the capacity building 
of States, expanding its range of tools to a niche beyond traditional capabilities. For that matter, 
it started to consider the role of cyber resources as a source of power in the international arena. 
In the course of the 2000s, the construction of cyber power resources is noticeably 
concurrent with the development of the country's security strategy documents which, after all, 
are a reflection of the evolution of the risks and threats arising from the external realm–and of 
Moscow's stance towards these. It follows that the doctrinal meaning of the term “strategic 
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deterrence” consolidates Moscow's assimilation of the reality of an international system whose 
security dynamics encompass a diverse range of capabilities, including cyber power. 
The recent versions of the country strategy papers, Military Doctrine (2014), National 
Security Strategy (2015), Foreign Policy Concept, and Information Security Doctrine (2016), 
generally signal Moscow's perception of a security environment characterized by: 
increasing global competition, the tension in the various areas interstate and interregional 
interaction, values and rivalry development patterns and processes of economic instability 
political developments at the global and regional levels background of the complications 
of international relations.[…], unresolved […] conflicts [to which there] is a tendency to 
force their resolution, in including in the regions bordering on the Russian Federation. 
[...] (Russia, 2014, §9, §10). 
 
For Moscow the existing “architecture [of] international security does not provide equal 
security for all States” (Russia, 2014, §10). In sum, its evolved in a tendency toward a scenario 
of complication of international relations  
Moscow still points to the West's inability to govern world politics and the economy 
(Russia, 2016, §4). The papers argue that attempts to impose Western values (as a result of the 
globalization process of the 1990s) as a means of democratization and growth for other 
countries, as well as an attempt to contain the emergence of alternative power centers, incite 
the instability of international systems, impacting on numerous regional conflicts. In other 
words, Russia points out that the current security instability is a product of the Western, and 
more specifically the United States’, unwillingness to share its dominant role in the system–
which means not accepting the already settled polycentric/multipolar reality. In this sense, 
Moscow is well aware of the role played by the use of cyber resources in government 
destabilization processes when it points out that, while the use of technological resources 
contributes to the economic development and better functioning of state institutions, they 
embody a range of new threats. 
The possibilities of transboundary information circulation are increasingly used for 
geopolitical goals, goals of a military-political nature contravening international law or 
for terrorist, extremist, criminal and other unlawful ends detrimental for international 
security and strategic stability [...] [A] number of foreign countries are building up their 
information technology capacities to influence the information infrastructure in pursuing 
military purposes (Russia, 2016, 10-11). 
 
From this finding, Moscow assumes that the use of cyber power in the sphere of national 
security is characterized for the: growing use by certain States and organizations of information 
technologies for military and political purposes, including for actions inconsistent with 
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international law and seek to undermine the sovereignty, political and social stability and 
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and its allies, and pose a threat to international 
peace, global and regional security (Russia, 2016, §15).  
The argument above, brought by the Russian Information Security Doctrine, verbalizes 
the propositions encompassed by the other strategic documents of the country regarding the 
political destabilization movements in the surroundings of the Russian territory. Moscow 
explains that such movements, like the Color Revolutions, make direct use of communication 
and information technologies for military purposes, acting against the sovereignty, political 
independence and territorial integrity of States (Russia, 2014, §12, 1- n. 13). The documents, 
albeit indirectly, allude to the similarity between the Color Revolutions and the Ukrainian 
Crisis, but mainly to the possibility of such movements spreading to the Russian domestic 
sphere. For the Russians, these movements are the basis of contemporary military conflicts 
which use indirect and asymmetrical operations, such as the use of political forces and public 
associations with external funding.  
For this purpose, the State must be prepared to deal with these new threats through non-
military channels, meanwhile it must also secure its traditional military means, considering the 
chances of escalating conflicts and real threats to State integrity and sovereignty. In this respect, 
they reserve themselves the right to incur in military means to deter non-military actions and/or 
conventional military aggression that threats Russian security, whether occurred in its territory 
or in the territory of allies, endangering the very existence of the State. In the same document, 
they postulate the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear or even non-nuclear 
attack of mass destruction against themselves and/or their allies (Russia, 2000, §8; Russia 2010, 
§22; Russia, 2014, §27). This is the logic behind the doctrinal meaning of “strategic deterrence” 
postulated in the Military Doctrine (2014): to have an effective link between military and non-
military capabilities for the defense of the country. The concept is elucidated as: 
a coordinated system of military and non-military measures carried out consecutively or 
simultaneously for the purpose of deterring military action by the opposing State (or 
coalition of States) involving strategic damage to the other party […]. Strategic 
Deterrence is aimed at stablishing a political-military situation [...] in order to influence 
an adversary within a predetermined framework or to de-escalate the military conflict 
[…] Strategic deterrence measures are carried out continuously in both peacetime and 
conflict. [...] Non-military measures include actions in several spheres, such as political, 
diplomatic, legal, economic, ideological, scientific and technical. [...] Military measures 
include: intelligence and information actions; demonstration of military presence and 
military strength; actions to ensure the safety of State economic activity; peacekeeping 
operations; air defense; protection and defense of the State border in air, sea and land 
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space; [...]; to make (or threaten to) precise (including nuclear) attacks (MD, 2019: 
online). 
 
There can be seen to be a linearity of strategic documents regarding the defensive 
character of the Russian actions in the system, either through the use of traditional military 
capabilities (conventional and nuclear weapons) or through the use of new power resources and 
tools, such as cyber capabilities. Regarding the latter, it must be made clear that there are 
significant differences in Russian and Western approaches to cyber power which makes 
understanding between the parties very difficult. As an example, it can be mentioned the 
controlling of the flow of information in cyber networks. For Russians, the circulation of 
information perceived as threats to society, strategic interests and state sovereignty is dealt as 
a security issue, with the government having the power to limit such threats. This is a reality 
that does not happen in the West, where the free circulation of information through networks 
prevails (Giles, 2012). Giles also make aware of the fact that Russia's vision of “information 
warfare” is not restricted to the circulation of information, having a far “more holistic concept 
than its literal translation suggests, carrying cyber operations implicitly within it alongside 
disciplines such as electronic warfare (EW), psychological operations (PsyOps), strategic 
communications and Influence” (Giles, 2012, p. 74). 
Since the collapse of the USSR and the restructuring of Russian capabilities, the use of 
cyber power resources has gone through a process of consolidation in the doctrines that embody 
Russia's strategic positioning. Some alleged Russian military action in the Georgian conflict 
(2008) have characteristics that give evidence of the use of cyber resources in the conduct of 
the conflict. It was also considered as a rehearsal for a more intense conflict with the West. 
David Hollis (2011) points out that Russian military actions were combined across four 
dimensions: air, land, sea and cyberspace. The Russian Forces were actually accused by the 
Georgian government of assaulting more than fifty-four websites in the neighboring country 
(linked to communication, finance and even government websites). The alleged actions by 
Moscow were aimed at hampering communications and limiting the decision-making process 
in Georgia. Hollis (2011) states that the Russian strategy was not intended to attack critical 
infrastructures but rather to hold sufficient capacity to enable them to do so. 
From the lessons learned from the alleged Russian actions, it should be noted that the 
lack of mastery of cyberspace has altered Georgia's ability to conduct communication strategies 
at the national level. In turn, the Russian capabilities allowed an integration between the 
different dimensions of the Armed Forces, with the cyber power and the outer space command 
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capabilities being essential in this case, serving for inter-force communications and also as a 
destabilizing tool of enemy forces in the conflict.  
In summary, there can be notice that Moscow is aware of the importance of using cyber 
resources to secure their status in the international political arena. To this end, it uses a defensive 
rhetoric, characteristic of its international strategic insertion design. 
BRICS and Cyber Resources: An Alternative Power Scenario for Russia? 
As presented above, 21st century Russia clearly understands two important issues regarding its 
dynamics in the international system: (1) that it is a relevant actor and will regain its power 
status quo on the international stage; (2) that non-military (or non-traditionally military) 
resources, such as cybernetics, are central to this Russian ambition. 
 However, it can be seen that, when Russia thinks about its international insertion 
processes, it has an effectively independent method of strategic planning, bringing to 
themselves the demands of such insertion. So, in this perspective, where would be the BRICS’ 
place, especially when we talk about cyber power? 
 The BRICS appear as an effective zone of importance in the late twentieth century, 
when the foundation of this importance was directly related to the capacities of economic 
growth and development (Davydov, 2018; Abdenur, 2017) that those countries seemed to 
possess in the opinion of Goldman & Sachs analysts. 
 In this perspective, the BRICS engaged in dynamics of confrontation with the 
hegemonic power that the USA had in the international system. The proposal was not to 
confront and replace this hegemon, but rather to create alternative power spaces where 
developing and poorer countries saw the possibility of gains in the BRICS. At the same time, 
increasing the relative power of the countries can be considered to be part of this acronym. 
 But the relationship was strictly based on an economic and cooperative dynamic in 
international organizations, in order to face insertion challenges together. In the dynamics of 
power resources and international security challenges, their joint action did not unfold as being 
effective. Their interaction in this area appeared at official meetings held by the BRICS. Yet 
the focus was always on a more generalist debate which privileged a perception of how to 
understand security issues and weigh them on the international agenda, rather than actually 
creating an alliance between countries to promote a cooperative security process. Topics such 
as cybercrime, terrorism and others were dealt with at conferences such as Fortaleza in 2015, 
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but they were nothing more than debates about conjunctures, not effectively turning into joint 
actions (Abdenur, 2017). 
 On the other hand, when we think of Russia, China and cyber power, what we see is a 
battle in international space for the control of two distinct action dynamics over this new 
security dimension. The first one is the USA and Europe seeking to determine how cyberspace 
will work. The second dimension is Russia and China trying to show themselves as exponents 
in this space, bringing new understandings and technologies, thus emerging as effective cyber 
power poles (Forsyth, 2013). 
 In this sense, when thinking of Russia, BRICS and cyber power, it is not possible to see 
an effective collaboration of these actors in order to create a cohesive group that determines 
and conducts cyber-dimension security actions.  
What we see is Russia being effectively centered on becoming a power pole in a multipolar 
system and using the cheapest, and least physically destructive, cyber resources to support its 
strategy. The BRICS in this dynamic appear more as a possible area of influence than effective 
cooperative partners (Davydov, 2018). 
Final Remarks 
In this brief essay, we sought to clarify the transition from traditional military 
capabilities to a wider range of resources, such as the Internet, and how Russia is adapting to 
the use of such capabilities as a power resource in the international arena. Therefore, from the 
analysis of the Russian military doctrine documents, the evolution of cyber power was 
considered as a mechanism for rebuilding its power in the international system of the new 
millennium, serving as a useful tool for Moscow. 
It is believed that, if at first Moscow would use available soft power resources for a 
multifaceted insertion, when restructuring its State capacity it has employed those we assume 
here as the precepts of smart power to counter external offensives on its surroundings and also 
to assume its position of power in a new multipolar world order. 
However, this strategy turns to a Russian international insertion that privileges its 
independence in the international system. Hence, the BRICS in this scenario is much more a 
space for the exercise of Russian power than for effective cooperation in cyber security. 
However, given the volatility of the international system, caution is needed in the analysis so 
definitive conclusions on the topic are left open. Likewise, from this first essay arises a vast 
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agenda of topics to be researched in the scope of the proposed theme, postulating continuity to 
the work developed.  
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